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Activism
in the Age of the
Sock Puppet
An examination of how performativity in modern forms of information subterfuge underminings activism
Houston, TX
Houston riot orchestrated by sock puppets on Facebook. Image source: San Antonio Current.
On May 21st, 2017, members of the "Heart of Texas" secessionist activist group on Facebook (1) and the "United Muslims of America" activist group, also on Facebook (2), coincidentally met in front of the Islamic Da'wah Center in Houston, Texas. In response to the quickly escalating aggression, the city dispatched dozens of law enforcement officers to keep the situation from turning into a riot.
Screenshots of the Houston Riot Facebook pages. Image source: San Antonio Current.
Through the work of Renee DiResta, Lyudmila Savchuk, and the Mueller Investigation, we learned later that this whole event was the work of "sock puppets" operating remotely out of St. Petersburg, Russia. The sock puppets, who did not identify with either community's core ideals, created the Facebook group pages, nonconsensually enrolled and developed both activist groups, socially manipulated them, and then scheduled the event itself. (3)
Between 2015 and 2018, hundreds of events like this one played out in similar ways around the U.S. (4)
History & Context
Sock Puppets, The IRA, and Data Science
The Internet Research Agency headquarters in St. Petersburg, Russia. Image source NPR.
Sock puppets are digital actors typically employed by state-funded intelligence organizations who disguise themselves in fabricated online personas and wage computational propaganda campaigns on social platforms to polarize and divide their audiences. (5)
In 2016 Rene DiResta, employed as a data scientist by the State Department under the Obama administration, was tasked with investigating how ISIS conducted their online information campaigns. DiResta's scrutiny into the data produced by Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and Youtube uncovered well-organized disinformation campaigns, most of which were active as early as 2013 and originating from an organization known as the Internet Research Agency (IRA) in St. Petersburg, Russia.
The IRA, later more explicitly defined by the Mueller Investigation, targeted specific communities and politicians, both domestically and internationally. (6)
About the same time, Lyudmila Savchuk, an internet activist living in St. Petersburg, spent two months working undercover at the IRA, known locally as the "troll factory." While undercover, she was trained in and tasked with writing social posts that would inflame anti-American sentiment among Russians, as well as engage in several "culture drift" operations in online communities in both the U.S. and Russia - all under a set of fabricated online personas. She was one of hundreds employed there, rotating on shifts, 24 hours a day. (7)
The narrative that emerges about the IRA resulting from the work of Savchuk and DiResta, and later during the Mueller Investigation, reveals a highly organized campaign - Training manuals for employees in the performance and communication etiquettes of specific activist communities; Time tables for the long term development of social pages, social media accounts, and sites; Strategies for attracting and socially manipulating activists themselves. (8, 9, 10)
The Strategy
Charlotte residents protest the fatal police shooting of Keith Lamont Scott on Sept. 23, 2016. Image Source: CS Monitor
According to Savchuk and DiResta, the IRA's overall strategy is to create civil unrest by exploiting existing controversies, exacerbating them, and making those controversies civilly unresolvable.
In 2017, after Keith Lamont Scott was killed by police officers in Charlotte, North Carolina, the IRA, paying specific attention to this event, stoked the community's emotional fires by generating dozens of posts on their African American-centric social media channels. @Crystal1Johnson, one of the IRA's most successful sock puppets on Instagram, posted:
"9 y.o. Zianna Oliphant delivered an emotional testimony to the #Charlotte city council. I'm in tears ..."
After securing the Charlotte police department's agreement to formally meet and publicly discuss the killing of Keith Lamont Scott at the head of a large group of angry protestors, Black Lives Matter Activist Greg Jackson remembers this social shift occurring in his community in the wake of the violence and the IRA's social posts. After shaking the police lieutenant's hand as a symbol of the agreement, Jackson was cat-called and threatened by the crowd. He says:
"I can remember it to this day being called a sell-out. The message was so negative. They weren't talking about rightful anger, but hate. So much of the messaging wanted to stop forward progress, overpower it." (11)
Social Messaging,
Social Pursuasion
IRA anti Hilary Clinton propaganda image from Facebook. Image source: BBC
During the 2016 election, DiResta discovered evidence that IRA sock puppets exerted social force on a variety of communities. Black communities, specifically, were targeted to demoralize and discourage voting for any party or cause.
For example, "Black Matters US" a famous IRA brand that consisted of a website, Youtube channel, Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram accounts, posted persuasive messaging, like this one:
"HILLARY RECEIVED $20,000 DONATION FROM KKK FOR HER CAMPAIGN."
The IRA sock puppets formulated bizarre requests for far-right wing activists. for example, they messaged pro-Trump activists during the 2016 election with offers of funding if they would drive around in a flatbed truck with a Hillary Clinton impersonator in a cage in the back, bearing the slogan #HillaryforPrison. (12)
However, the IRA's disinformation agents targeted individuals, communities, and groups all across social, racial, and political spectrums, not just far-right activists. One of the points I am approaching here is that activists and activism (no matter the ideological stance) are extremely useful for eliciting forms of social control that appear to be honest to the communities they are manipulating. "Culture-drift" operations (especially state-sponsored ones) are about manipulating ideological parameters to suite a specific outcome-and activists provide a perfect cover for that whether the activists themselves know they are being manipulated or not.
IRA:
Social Account Statistics
DiResta's IRA Report
Here is a quick statistical look at the IRA’s social media activity, as reported by DiResta: (13)
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3,800 accounts
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10.5 million tweets
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6 million of those pushing original content
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81 pages
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75 million engagements
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30 of those had over 1000 followers
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Top 10 had more than 500k followers each.
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133 accounts
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116k posts
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200 million engagements (likes, shares, comments, reactions)
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Top 10 had more than 500k followers each.
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Top 5 accounts targeting Black communities, specifically including: @Blackstagram with 300k followers and @Crystal1Johnson with 56k followers
Youtube
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17 channels
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1,100 videos
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Including the Williams & Calvin "A Word of Truth" channel with more than 100k followers
"Sock Puppetry"
as Methodology
Ethics or Consequence?
Boal presenting a workshop on the Riverside Church in New York, 13 May 2008. Image source: Wikipedia.
Of course, and even more insidiously, the very discovery of the IRA's activities promotes one of its core agendas: inspire paranoia and fear in the audience. Though this is disturbing, are the non-consensual relationships sock puppets establish with activists a question of ethics or consequence?
In the 1960s, the Brazilian theatre practitioner, Augusto Boal, developed Invisible Theatre as a form of theatrical activism in response to the oppressive military dictatorships in both Argentina and Brazil. Occurring anywhere, and seemingly out of nowhere, the performers in Invisible Theatre productions would disguise the performance as a real and unstaged event. These performances were highly political and meant to coerce nonconsensual observers into reacting in specific ways. (14)
Despite performing in different contexts, both Boal's Invisible Theatre and the IRA's sock puppets employ essentially the same methodology. Even with differing subjective ethics at work, they are doing the same thing.
In his book Spam, Finn Bruton addresses this question of ethics by evaluating the interactions between internet spammers and the anti-spam activist movement between 1980 and 2013. Brunton makes the point that the opportunistic spammers and vigilante anti-spammers both used ethical arguments to enable and excuse their behaviors - and that both existed in balanced opposition within an evolving reciprocal relationship. (15)
Similarly, Whitney Phillips, in her book This Is Why We Can't Have Nice Things, outlines the social phenomenon of what we think of as online "trolling" as a matter of perspective. For Phillips, trolling derives from culturally sanctioned impulses that are defined by context. Phillips distinguishes individuals who troll as a leisure activity from big media who troll with sensationalist headlines as a business strategy. (16)
Sock puppeting, similar to trolling or spamming, is a digital methodology. Since it's ethical nature is highly subjective, it is more helpful to look at sock puppeting as a development in the online arms race - whether governments utilize it, organizations, or even activists, themselves.
Difficulties with Identification
Appearances are Everything
Houston riot orchestrated by sock puppets on Facebook. Image source: San Antonio Current.
When learning about the IRA's possible involvement in the "Heart of Texas" vs. "United Muslims of America" conflict in Houston, Chris Martin, one of the "Heart of Texas" Facebook group's activists, claimed:
"The counter-protest [he calls it a counter protest] was in no way shape or form initiated, promoted, or controlled by Russian operatives…I personally know many of the counter-protest organizers." (17)
Martin was, of course, incorrect. The event, like the "Heart of Texas" page itself, including all of its development and community discourses, were the work of the "troll factory." In this case, the sock puppets very nearly accomplished their goal: make the event appear as if it happened organically and allowed the activists involved to take the blame and suffer the consequences for the conflict.
This anecdote is, of course, troubling. However, the more poignant malignancy lies in our inability or unwillingness to identify the situation for what it truly is, primarily when driven by, or, in some cases, even blinded by passionate conviction. But is this a realistic expectation? Performing real activism between sock puppets, dueling automations, social media algorithmic manipulation, and a saturated attention economy is difficult. Even though we are now aware of how they operate, rest assured, the sock puppet methodology will continue to evolve - and so too must activism.
It may be that for us to immunize ourselves digitally, we naturally counter the sock puppets by mimicking them. Of course, this is inherently problematic. Who wants to live in that kind of world? Perhaps a better solution may lie in forming activist clusters with dedicated members that specialize in protecting the environments in which other activists operate. However, there may be no easy answer here. I would argue that we may be witnessing one of those rare social collisions that forces the ideological intentionality out of the performance, and replaces it with something more pragmatic and tactical.
Image produced by Adam Wright
The Core Issues
A Dangerous Convenience
Image produced by Adam Wright
Houston's events also tell us that making assumptions about real convictions, alignments, or the integrities of those we communicate with online is both questionable and dangerous. Before the digital era, community building for activists was arduous, even hazardous. However, community building was a very different occupation that, in most cases, required physical meetings where activists had the opportunity to engage and take advantage of the high-resolution information produced by their embodied experiences. As the digital age descended upon us, we traded the necessity of initial physical meetings and analog organizational approaches for the conveniences afforded by online digital tools and social media. This convenience has ultimately deprived us of meaningful physical experiences that strengthen our communities and make the work of counteragents more difficult.
Social Capital & Identity
An activist's ability to bring awareness is highly dependent on the support of communities who are willing to listen and participate. Activists need social capital to be effective and to inspire future generations to take up the practice. The IRA's sock puppets work actively diminishes that social capital by influencing the activist through manipulation and silently placing them at the center of controversies.
In his article Who Is This ‘We’ You Speak of? Grounding Activist Identity in Social Psychology, Jonathan Horowitz claims that activists are vulnerable to appeals of identity. (18) When courting activists, sock puppets attempt to appeal to and exploit their target's sense of identity as it relates to their activism. By appealing to the activist's sense of identity, they engage the activist's emotional center and evoke trust. According to this methodology, the more closely aligned an individual's identity is with their activism, the more vulnerable they are to manipulation. And for some of us, this alignment is not only a necessity but inescapable. People who social identify themselves as “Activists” typically think of themselves and their practices as being “on the right side of history”, whatever their world views may be–which tends to make the term very subjective.
Conclusion
More Questions Than Answers
If methods like this exist–social manipulation through social media channels, digital performativity, AI-generated mediums with ideological purposes–
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Where does this leave activists and activism?
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Is the entanglement of identity and activism inherently problematic when engaged in passionate advocacy?
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How does the existence of these tools and methodologies fundamentally change passionate advocacy?
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How do we understand activism going forward?
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Is an Activist still on the “right side of history” if they are using these tools themselves?
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What are our boundaries?
Endnotes
1. Zielinski, Alex. “Facebook Shuts Down Popular Texas Secessionist Page — Because It's Probably Run by Russia.” Alex Zielinski on Fri, Sep 15, 2017 at 4:48 Pm, 15 Sept. 2017, 4:48 pm, www.sacurrent.com/the-daily/archives/2017/09/15/facebook-shuts-down-popular-texas-secessionist-page-because-its-probably-run-by-russia.
2. Poulsen, Kevin, et al. Exclusive: Russians Impersonated Real American Muslims to Stir Chaos on Facebook and Instagram, The Daily Beast, 27 Sept. 2017, 4:41PM, www.thedailybeast.com/exclusive-russians-impersonated-real-american-muslims-to-stir-chaos-on-facebook-and-instagram.
3. Zielinski, Alex. Russian Trolls Organized Both Sides of an Islam Protest in Texas, San Antonio Current, 1 Nov. 2017, 2:56 pm, www.sacurrent.com/the-daily/archives/2017/11/01/russian-trolls-organized-both-sides-of-an-islam-protest-in-texas.
4. Rogan, Joe, and Renée DiResta. How Russian Bots Coordinated Facebook Events | Joe Rogan & Renée DiResta, Youtube, 12 Mar. 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=wpQjyv7iKYg.
5. DiResta, Renée. Computational Propaganda, Yale Review, 2018, yalereview.yale.edu/computational-propaganda.
6. DiResta, Renée, and Joe Rogan. Joe Rogan | The Origins of Russian Bots w/Renée DiResta, Joe Rogan, Youtube, 12 Mar. 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=EsHJzyOo5KI.
7. Myers, Jolie, and Monika Evstatieva. Meet The Activist Who Uncovered The Russian Troll Factory Named In The Mueller Probe, National Public Radio (NPR), 15 Mar. 2018, 4:13 PM, www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/03/15/594062887/some-russians-see-u-s-investigation-into-russian-election-meddling-as-a-soap-ope.
8. DiResta, Renée, and Joe Rogan. Joe Rogan | The Origins of Russian Bots w/Renée DiResta, Joe Rogan, Youtube, 12 Mar. 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=EsHJzyOo5KI.
9. Myers, Jolie, and Monika Evstatieva. Meet The Activist Who Uncovered The Russian Troll Factory Named In The Mueller Probe, National Public Radio (NPR), 15 Mar. 2018, 4:13 PM, www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/03/15/594062887/some-russians-see-u-s-investigation-into-russian-election-meddling-as-a-soap-ope.
10. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC Et Al. no. Case 1:18-cr-00032-DLF, 16 Feb. 2018.
11. Jonsson, Patrik, and Christa Case Bryant. After Russian Trolls Target Black Americans, One City Fights Back, Christian Science Monitor, 6 Dec. 2019, www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2019/1206/After-Russian-trolls-target-black-Americans-one-city-fights-back.
12. DiResta, Renée, and Joe Rogan. Did Russian Bots Impact the Election? | Joe Rogan & Renée DiResta, Joe Rogan, Youtube, 12 Mar. 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=_2Y8ix2jaSI.
13. DiResta, Renée, and Joe Rogan. Did Russian Bots Impact the Election? | Joe Rogan & Renée DiResta, Joe Rogan, Youtube, 12 Mar. 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=_2Y8ix2jaSI.
14. Boal, Augusto. 2000. Theatre of the Oppressed. 3rd ed. London: Pluto. ISBN 978-0-7453-1657-4
15. Brunton, Finn. Spam: a Shadow History of the Internet. MIT Press Ltd, 2013.
16. Phillips, Whitney. This Is Why We Can't Have Nice Things: Mapping the Relationship between Online Trolling and Mainstream Culture. The MIT Press, 2015.
17. Zielinski, Alex. Russian Trolls Organized Both Sides of an Islam Protest in Texas, San Antonio Current, 1 Nov. 2017, 2:56 pm,
18. Horowitz, Jonathan. “Who Is This ‘We’ You Speak of? Grounding Activist Identity in Social Psychology.” Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World, vol. 3, 2017, p. 237802311771781., doi:10.1177/2378023117717819.
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